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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                              19 CR 850 (JSR)
                V.
                                              Telephone Conference
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     PARKER H. PETIT AND WILLIAM
     TAYLOR,
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                     Defendants.
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 8
                                              New York, N.Y.
9
                                              October 23, 2020
                                              2:00 p.m.
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     Before:
                           HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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     AUDREY STRAUSS,
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          Acting United States Attorney for the
          Southern District of New York
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      SCOTT HARTMAN
     EDWARD IMPERATORE
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     DANIEL TRACER
          Assistant United States Attorneys
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          JENNIFER LOEB
          -AND-
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     KOBRE & KIM LLP
     BY: MATTHEW I. MENCHEL
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          AMANDA TUMINELLI
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     QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART & SULLIVAN LLP
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     BY: WILLIAM WEINREB
          DANIEL KOFFMANN
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          MICHAEL PACKARD
          KATHLEEN MARINI
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(The Court and all parties appearing telephonically)

THE COURT: This is Judge Rakoff.

Could counsel please identify themselves.

MR. HARTMAN: Good afternoon, your Honor. Scott
Hartman, for the government. And with me on the line for the
government are Edward Imperatore and Daniel Tracer from my
office.

MR. WEINREB: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is William Weinreb, on behalf of Mr. Taylor. And with me on the line are William Burke, Daniel Koffmann, and Michael Packard. Mr. Taylor is also on the line.

MR. BRUCE: Good afternoon, your Honor. This is Eric Bruce, along with my colleagues, Jennifer Loeb, Matthew Menchel, Amanda Tuminelli, on behalf of Mr. Petit, who is also on the line.

THE COURT: Thank you, all, for calling.

I was a little taken aback by the volume of motions in limine filed in this case. You should all recognize that there's no right to a motion in limine. They are a courtesy provided by the Court in cases in order to help flag in advance issues that might otherwise occupy sidebars or recesses, but as you might anticipate, many questions of what will be allowed and not allowed cannot be made — many decisions on that cannot be made until well into the trial because they may turn on how things have developed, and trials, by their nature, don't

always go according to plan. Nevertheless, I will give you my rulings on those that I think can be ruled on currently, but I also want to note that all these rulings are subject to the qualification that things could change. The most obvious such instance, which happens, in my experience, very frequently, is that the Court, on a motion in limine, will exclude a certain kind of evidence, and then the other side goes and opens the door, and then I have no choice but to admit that evidence because it's reasonably responsive to what the other side put in. And there's no way I can anticipate that in advance. So all these rulings I'm about to give come with that caveat.

The first motion in limine, the defendants move to preclude the government from using certain terms that they consider prejudicial, such as shell company, bribe, kickback, and the like.

That motion is denied. Those are everyday terms familiar to most jurors. They are not inflammatory. They describe misconduct, which is what the government is charging, and if they can't be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, of course, that will inure to the benefit of the defendants. So that motion is denied.

The second motion is that the defendants move to preclude the government from introducing evidence of Mr. Petit's wealth. I think that this should be granted in part and denied in part. General statements about the wealth

of any party, or any witness, for that matter, is usually totally irrelevant and can be prejudicial. However, the nature and amount of the defendant's compensation from MiMedx is, as I understand it, tied in part to the alleged motive and intent that the defendants had for their alleged misconduct, and in that context, it can be admitted. So the best guidance I can give you at this preliminary stage is a statement, let's say, on opening statement by the government, if the opening statement was, and Defendant X is a rich, rich man, that would be totally improper, but if the statement was something of, "And Defendant X had a financial motive to do what he did, and here's what it was," that would be proper.

Third, the government moves to preclude the defendants from introducing evidence relating to their age, health conditions, family background, charitable giving, and military service, or the like. Once again, this motion is granted in part and denied in part. The jury is entitled to have some basics about a party's background, although I caution the defense that this cannot be introduced through hearsay, but if, for example, the defendants took the stand, they could describe their upbringing and things of that sort, that would be perfectly proper.

Charitable giving is, I think, less relevant and more likely to be misleading. And military service beyond the fact of military service would probably not be allowed, but, again,

some of this will have to be decided on a question-by-question basis; the most I can do now is give you that general overview.

With respect to the fourth motion, the government moves to preclude the defense from introducing evidence relating to punishment and the like. The defense does not object, and says they have no plans of introducing such evidence. So that motion is, depending how you like to look at it, it's either moot or granted on consent.

Fifth, the government moves to preclude the defense from introducing evidence about the healing effect of MiMedx's product. I don't really see that this is materially relevant to any issue in this case. It really doesn't go to good faith. The allegation here is an accounting fraud, and if it was a fraud just because you thought the product was good, that's no defense; if there was no fraud, you don't need any evidence that the product was good. So that motion is essentially granted.

The sixth motion is Mr. Taylor moves to preclude the government from calling witnesses in MiMedx's accounting department, the audit committee, and Cherry Bekaert, MiMedx's outside auditing firm, seeks to preclude them from answering questions about the accounting treatment of the sales at issue in this case. I think, as I understand it from the government's response, the government primarily wants to ask, if you had known X, or Y, or Z, would you have accounted for

these transactions in the same way you did? And that is perfectly proper. It goes to materiality, it goes to concealment. If we get into more technical accounting issues, I may need to modify this if it begins to look like it's constituting improper expert testimony, but, for now, the motion is denied.

Seventh, Mr. Petit moves to preclude the government from having accountants at Cherry Bekaert testify as fact witnesses that the loan to SLR was a related-party transaction that MiMedx was required to disclose in its public filings with the SEC, and that representations from Petit to Cherry Bekaert were false. Although this was filed, as were several other motions from the defense that we'll talk about later, a week after the cutoff date for motions were due, allegedly because the government had not earlier signaled that it would seek to introduce such evidence in its case, which, I might add, is no excuse whatsoever for filing something without permission of the Court beyond the deadline set by the Court, but we'll talk about all that later.

I think I cannot rule on this motion until the question is put to the first accountant to whom it is put, because I think it will turn on both how the question is phrased, and what's been admitted up to then, and so forth. I could well conceive that question might not be asked or might not be permitted on direct, but might be permitted on redirect,

so this is a good example of one that I think is appropriate for the Court to reserve on at this time.

Eighth, the defendants move to preclude the government from introducing statements from certain unindicted coconspirators unless and until the Court finds these individuals qualify as coconspirators. That used to be the law. It hasn't been law for about 30 years. Statements of the sort referenced here can come into evidence subject to connection. If the connection is not made, I will then instruct the jury, in fairly specific detail, what they need to exclude and not take into account, but the statements will come in at the time proffered.

Ninth, the defense moves to preclude the government from introducing evidence concerning parallel civil litigation against defendants. I'm dubious that this will be admitted, but I can't rule finally on it. The government says that they believe this will be a basis to show motive, bias, et cetera, but they also say they will only introduce such evidence on cross-examination. So when we get to cross-examination, if the matter comes up, I'll rule on it then.

Tenth, the government seeks to exclude evidence that after the reporting periods at issue in this case, some of the four distributors ultimately paid all or part of their outstanding debts to the company. That is both irrelevant and prejudicial, and that motion is granted.

Eleventh, the government seeks to require the defense to make an evidentiary proffer before offering a reliance-on-accountant defense. I think it's premature. Let's see if the defense does offer this. If so, I may allow the government to call rebuttal witnesses, but until unless it's actually offered, I don't think I need to reach that issue.

Twelfth, similarly, the government seeks to require the defense to make a factual proffer before introducing evidence of interactions with lawyers to show the defendants acted in good faith. I'm skeptical that can be done without a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, but, again, it's premature at this point, so we'll deal with it when it is an actuality, if it does become one.

Thirteenth, the government seeks to admit evidence of Mr. Petit's prior involvement in a prior enforcement action by the SEC concerning accounting improprieties at Healthdyne, Inc. It's claimed that this is not only 404(b) evidence, but also shows Mr. Petit's knowledge and understanding that certain transactions could be used to conceal the kind of scheme that's charged here in the indictment. Normally, I would rule on this motion after opening statements - let's see what the defense says about their defense in this case - but assuming, as is so often the case in white collar criminal cases, that the defense is lack of intent, then, subject to further argument, I am at least leaning towards allowing this in with, of course, an

appropriate limiting instruction as to Mr. Taylor.

Fourteenth, Mr. Taylor moves to preclude the government from introducing evidence relating to the 2016 revenue recognition memo absent a showing that Taylor had knowledge reflected in the memo in 2015, when the contested transactions occurred. I think the premise of this motion, that the memo postdates conduct charged in the indictment, is wrong, and so that motion is denied.

Fifteenth, Mr. Petit moves to preclude a statement concerning the nature and extent of his involvement in the SLR loan made in the so-called white paper, which, as I understand it, the government intends to introduce to try to show that he misled the audit committee by lying to his own lawyers about his involvement in the SLR loan. I am inclined to think that the probative value of this is more than outweighed by the possibility of confusion and prejudice, and so I grant the motion to exclude.

Sixteenth, the defendants move to preclude the government from introducing evidence relating to the audit committee's investigations and findings because they are improper evidence, unduly prejudicial, and so forth. The government argues this motion is moot because it has agreed not to introduce this evidence in its case in chief, but it reserves the right to introduce the evidence during cross-examination.

So this was a classic case where it would be premature for me to rule on it now. If and when it comes up later in the trial, I'll rule on it then.

Seventeenth, the defense moves to preclude the government from introducing evidence regarding their respective terminations from MiMedx in 2018. The government says that it had told defense counsel it would not introduce such evidence in its case in chief provided the defense agreed not to question any government witness regarding the separation of any witness from the company following the audit committee report.

Again, as that proposed arrangement indicates, it's really premature for me to rule on this now, though I am leaning towards granting the defense motion, but I can't say that for sure until we see how it all plays out.

Eighteenth, the defense moves to preclude the government from introducing evidence related to MiMedx's receipt of revenue in 2020. The government argues this motion is most because it has agreed not to introduce the evidence in its case in chief.

I am again leaning towards probably granting this motion, obviously, but given the government's statement, it's premature to rule on it finally at this point.

Nineteenth, the defendants move to preclude the government from introducing any evidence related to AvKARE as irrelevant, prejudicial, et cetera. It says that the

government had represented they would not put this at issue. I'm, again, leaning towards granting the motion, but I'm not going to make a final decision now. We'll see how it plays out. For now, it's premature.

Twentieth, the government seeks to preclude defendants from introducing evidence that they did not engage in fraud with customers other than CPN, SLR, Stability, and First Medical. That motion is granted.

Twenty-first, the government moves to preclude the defense from offering the proffered expert opinions of Jason Flemmons. This relates, also, to a Rule 17 subpoena issue that we'll get to later. At this point, it's premature; we haven't gotten to the defense case. I think it is likely that we will have a hearing outside the presence of the jury probably some evening before we get to the — shortly before we get to the defense case regarding the proffered expert opinions of Mr. Flemmons, but I decline to rule on them now.

Twenty-second, the government seeks to exclude cross-examination of certain witnesses on certain admitted or suspected bad acts, such as an arrest for selling marijuana, a conviction for drunk driving, and the like. While the defense has confirmed that they will not cross-examine regarding these arrests, they say they may seek to show that the witness did not originally disclose certain arrests to the government, and this goes to the cooperation agreement that these witnesses in

some cases had.

Again, it's premature for me to rule on this until we get to those circumstances, but I am initially inclined to grant the government's motion. Incidentally, if either side is about to put a question to a witness that seemingly was either precluded by one of my in limine rulings or that I left open, do not put the question in the hearing of the jury. We can either have a sidebar, or often it will be just sufficient to say, Judge, this relates to an in limine ruling you made, and you can use the numbers that I'm giving you this afternoon in saying that, but don't put the question until, of course, I have permitted the question, if I do.

There was a twenty-third motion in limine received out of time from the defense, which seeks to preclude the government's summary witness, Corina Chanbury, from testifying regarding the effect of the alleged fraud on Mr. Petit's and Mr. Taylor's bonuses. That motion is denied.

There was also filed last night, without permission of the Court, a motion to quash the government's Rule 17 subpoena to the defense expert witness, Jason Flemmons. I may want to hear further argument on this, either in a few minutes or first thing Monday morning, but my initial take is that the defense doesn't have standing to challenge the subpoena.

There was also a joint telephone call made to my chambers on October 21st, a couple of days ago, regarding five

new applications. I instructed my law clerk to tell counsel that these would be taken up today, but he did hear enough to know what they were generally about.

The first was whether to permit the video testimony of Pam Martin in light of her numerous health issues. That application is granted. I do note that the government, understandably, is miffed that the defense is making this application when they refused to give a similar courtesy, allegedly, to the government with respect to certain government witnesses. However, this is the only application that was brought to my attention, and I think they have made out a case. Moreover, the confrontation clause questions don't arise with respect to a defense witness in the way that they would with respect to a government witness.

The second application was the defense asked the Court to reconsider its previous order granting in part and denying in part the defense's request for A/V equipment. By way of background, I granted the defense's request for permission to bring in two trial laptops for realtime transcript feeds, switches and cables, and, indeed, there was a gentleman hired by the defense who was busy in the courtroom earlier today, laying all sorts of switches and cables that was at least interesting to watch.

But I have denied defense counsel's request for a flat panel monitor and an A/V table with a skirt. The defense

recognizes that it failed to provide the Court sufficient context for why those things are necessary. I will hear from counsel in a minute on that.

The third application was the defense sought leave to submit a letter listing the motions in limine they'd like guidance on from the Court before the trial. The government would also file such a letter. Thank you, but I've already now accommodated, in effect, that request.

Application four was the government request that the Court seek a maximum number of alternative jurors. The defense takes no position.

I think the appropriate number of alternate jurors here is four, which will also work very well with the seating, so we can have eight jurors in one of the parts of the jury box separated by six feet, et cetera, and the other eight in the other jury box. I will give the defense three peremptory challenges with respect to the alternates, and I will give the government two peremptory challenges with respect to the alternates.

And, finally, the government has apparently various orders and affidavits for immunity from three government witnesses and wants to know how to proceed. My standard practice there is you supply me in advance with the relevant papers, we then, out of the presence of the jury, put the witness on the stand, ascertain that he or she will, in fact,

be invoking his privilege against self-incrimination across the board, and then I sign the order, and then the witness gets called when the witness gets called.

Incidentally, in the courtroom we will be using, 24B, there is a side room, which, in a different pre-pandemic situation, could be used for conferences. I think that's a good place — that can easily accommodate up to two witnesses who are going to be testifying after whoever is on the stand. I never, ever want to have a situation where one side or the other, when I say call your next witness, says, oh, Judge, he or she is ten blocks away, or he or she didn't think we'd get there today, or anything like that. But there is, consistent with the courthouse protocols, plenty of room in this conference room right outside the front of the courtroom for at least two pending witnesses.

With respect to the selection of the jury, I use the jury box method, which will be slightly affected by the pandemic, but only slightly. We will bring in a panel of 60 prospective jurors. About 37, I believe, or, anyway, some portion of them will be in the jury room on the first floor of the courthouse, the others will be in a courtroom on the ninth floor, with total video connection. The jurors will be given seat numbers randomly by the people who run the jury system. So we will have one juror in seat number one, another juror in seat number two, and so forth, and they will be in those seats.

We will meet initially in the courtroom, 26B, at 9:45. When the jurors are all seated, we will go down to begin jury selection. I will examine Jurors 1 through 12 for cause. If any of them are replaced for cause, the first one replaced will be replaced by number 13, who will then come and take the seat of the juror who was excused. So if, for example, two jurors are excused for cause, one number 4 and one number 6, the juror occupying seat 13 would come up and take seat number 6.

After I've examined the 12 jurors for cause, the parties will exercise their peremptory challenges - six for the government, ten for the defense jointly - and this will be done in rounds. So in the first four rounds, there will be one challenge by the government, two challenges by the defense; in the final two rounds, it will be one challenge by the government and one challenge by the defense.

If a party waives its challenge on a given round, it loses that challenge, but it does not lose its subsequent challenge/challenges unless both sides waive across the board on a given round, in which case, we have our jury.

After we've gone through that for the basic jury, we'll go through a similar process for the alternate jurors. We'll have the jurors who are next in line, so to speak, come up and take seats 13, 14, 15, 16, and I'll question them for cause, and we will have two rounds of challenges, and the

first, it will be two challenges for the defense, one for the government; the second round, there will be one challenge per side.

After the jury is selected, they will be taken to courtroom 26B, and after a short break, we will have opening statements and possibly even the first witness. As I mentioned before, we will normally sit from 9:45 to 3:45, we will take a 15-minute midmorning break at some point, and we will take an hour for lunch probably around 12:45 to 1:45, but no break in the afternoon. So if the jury comes back at 1:45, they will sit without a break till 3:45.

There will be some days when, because of other matters, we'll have to sit fewer hours I just indicated. The only one that I want to mention now is Election Day, when we will not sit at all. Every other day, Monday through Friday, we will sit, though it won't always be the full 9:45 to 3:45.

Now, let me pause. I am not giving permission to any lawyer to reargue any of the motions in limine that I have just ruled on, so that is forbidden, but if there are other questions, and there was the one application that I was a little unclear about, I'm happy to hear from counsel now. And I also want to know how long each of you wants for your opening statement.

So let's start with -- there was an application from the defense to put in -- you wanted to give a greater

explanation for -- about a flat panel monitor and A/V table with skirts, so let me hear from whichever defense counsel wants to address that.

MR. PACKARD: Thank you, your Honor. This is Michael Packard, on behalf of the defendant, William Taylor.

Briefly, your Honor, the situation with the table is that we understand the table that is provided as a matter of course has room, essentially, for one laptop on it, and our trial consultant generally, and preferably, would have two laptops on the table, and a lot of that is to make sure that there aren't any hiccups that would delay presentation to the Court, particularly in —

THE COURT: What do you mean by your trial consultants?

MR. PACKARD: I'm sorry. That's just the name of the -- that's the title for the individual who would be in the hot seat, I think, is the term used on a previous call.

THE COURT: Well, if so, I don't recall it, but are you talking about a lawyer from your firm?

MR. PACKARD: No, sir.

Actually, I have a realtime update. Our hot seat person, our trial consultant, just walked in the room and advised me that he no longer needs a table, having seen the space today. He just walked into the room where I'm sitting.

THE COURT: Great. That's terrific.

The reason I'm asking this is while we're voir diring the jury, if you're making use of outside technical people of one sort or another, we need to at least introduce them to the jury, or at least give their names and their companies' names to make sure that no prospective juror has any connection to that. So keep that in mind when we're selecting the jury.

MR. PACKARD: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So it sounds like we're moot on that application.

How long does -- let's start with the defense. How long do each of the defendants want for opening statements?

MR. BRUCE: Your Honor, this is Eric Bruce, on behalf of Mr. Petit.

I think we had previously discussed this with your Honor on a prior call, and you indicated --

THE COURT: I think I told you I never allow more than 30 minutes on opening statements. But how much do you want?

MR. BRUCE: Well, if there's any flexibility on that, if we could have an additional five or ten minutes, that would be helpful, but, if not, of course, we'll adhere to whatever your Honor's ruling is.

THE COURT: Well, my impression from -- after a case is over, either I or my law clerk always talk to the jurors, and so I've now had occasion to talk to jurors in over 300 trials. One of the things they tell me was, I found that

opening totally confusing, he got into all that detail, and I didn't have any way to really make sense of it at that point.

And that's been one of the reasons why I have imposed a 30-minute deadline, to prevent confusion of the jurors. So I think I'm going to adhere to that, so there will be 30 minutes a side for each of the defendants.

Now, how long does the government want?

MR. TRACER: Your Honor, this is Daniel Tracer, for the government. We would ask for 30 minutes, although we'll do our best to come in shorter than that.

THE COURT: All right. Very good. So it's 30 minutes for each party. That's great.

There may be complications because of the pandemic, but in the normal course, I usually pick a jury within, at most, an hour and a half. And, of course, we can't get started until the jury folks downstairs tell us they're ready, but assuming we were to start at 10:00 o'clock, then we would probably go through all three openings, assuming we have the jury picked by 11:30, and then take lunch at 1:00. If, by contrast, things don't move as quickly, we may take an early lunch and then have all three openings afterwards. If worst comes to worst, we'll bifurcate and have one or two openings before and one after, but I would like to avoid that, if we can.

Before I take up the last item on my list, which is

the question of sanctions, is there anything else any party wants to raise with the Court?

MR. BRUCE: Your Honor, this is Eric Bruce again, on behalf of Mr. Petit, if I may.

Mr. Herenstein had asked us for some background information that would go into a preliminary instruction to the jury.

THE COURT: Yes, thank you very much for raising that.

MR. BRUCE: Yes, of course.

THE COURT: I do this in virtually all my trials, and, again, in talking to the jury afterwards, I've heard unanimous appreciation for doing this. This should be, at most, a two-page document, and it could be even just one page, that says to the jury: You will receive, at the end of the case, my detailed instructions on all the issues, but, for now, I just want to give you a heads-up as to some of the issues that will be presented, so you can devote some of your attention to those issues, and these issues are one, two, three, or something like that.

What I ask each side is to prepare a no more than two-page proposed instruction of that sort, submit it to me very early. I like to give this instruction no later than the third day of trial, and it's better the second day, so I would want this instruction by close of business the first day. And then I will put together the instruction, hold a conference

outside the hearing of the jury, and hear whatever each side has to say about objections, or suggestions, or so forth.

By the way, we will typically allot some time at the end of the day for any matters that are going to come up the next day that we can foresee like this one.

In addition, of course, if there's more urgency, we'll take them up during a break or even during the lunch break, and worst case at sidebar, but I prefer to avoid lengthy sidebars.

Again, all the jurors I've ever talked to said that they were bored stiff while sidebars went on for any length of time.

In terms of objections that I may have covered previously, normally, objections should be no more than three words. The first word is objection, the second word and the third word are either the nature of the objection in English, like hearsay, foundation, or the like, or a reference to the relevant rule of evidence, like 403. The one addition that we've added today is if it relates to an in limine motion, you can say, "Objection; in limine motion number so-and-so," and I guess even those that's four or five words, I'll allow that exception.

Okay. What else?

MR. BRUCE: Your Honor, Eric Bruce again.

Just so we make sure we submit on the preliminary instructions what your Honor wants, did you want an instruction for each of the two defendants or a joint instruction from the

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two defendants? 1 2 THE COURT: Joint. 3 MR. BRUCE: Joint? Okay. 4 THE COURT: What I'm going to give the jury won't be, 5 of course, just one instruction for all three, for the two 6 defendants and the government. 7 MR. BRUCE: Understood. THE COURT: Yes. Okay, very good. 8 9 MR. BRUCE: Thank you, your Honor. 10 THE COURT: Anything else? 11 MR. HARTMAN: Your Honor, this is Mr. Hartman, for the 12 government. 13 Judge, we just wanted to raise one issue -- actually, 14 we have a couple of things we wanted to raise with you. 15 One is on Wednesday night, consistent with your Honor's individual practices, we provided the Court with a list 16 17 of our anticipated witnesses and the order in which we expect 18 to call them. In the course of preparing that, we realized we 19 failed to list the paralegal who we would expect to call as a 20 summary witness in this case. So we were seeking permission for the Court to amend that. 21 22 THE COURT: Is that the lady whose name I mentioned

previously?

MR. HARTMAN: No, your Honor. That is an economist who will be doing the bonus calculations, but we were also

anticipating calling someone who would read emails and the like and put in evidence that would not come --

THE COURT: What is her name?

MR. HARTMAN: His name is Jacob Pechet, P-e-c-h-e-t.

THE COURT: I'm sorry.

MR. HARTMAN: That's fine.

THE COURT: That will be allowed.

MR. HARTMAN: Thank you, your Honor.

The other question we had is about, to the extent we have other issues, would the Court like to hear those now, or do you want to hold off on those till Monday morning?

Specifically, this relates somewhat to the subpoena that the defense filed a motion about. We have some concerns about the disclosures that we've gotten so far and the adequacy of those disclosures, and so we wanted to talk to the Court about that.

The other issue is we've identified some areas in some of the defense exhibits that we think may be objectionable, and we wanted to flag those issues for the Court as well, so that that's all teed up.

THE COURT: Well, the latter, again, just strikes me as totally premature. If I recall correctly, the government and the defense think this case is going to go, what, three, four, even five weeks. Do I have that right?

MR. HARTMAN: That's --

THE COURT: So there's going to be plenty of time

before we get to the defense exhibits, so I don't see any reason why I should deal with them today.

On the other issue, about the subpoena and the scope of what you receive, I will deal with that in a minute, so we'll come back to you on that before this call is over.

MR. HARTMAN: Okay. Thank you, Judge. Those are the only issues we have at this time, then.

THE COURT: Okay.

Anything from the defense?

MR. BRUCE: Nothing for Mr. Petit. Thank you, your Honor.

MR. PACKARD: Nothing for Mr. Taylor, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

So, I was so excited when I got this case because, in addition to the excellent AUSAs, I saw that the defendants were represented by some of the most illustrious law firms in the country. So I was totally taken aback when it seemed like repeatedly my rules and my orders were being disregarded. So does someone want to speak to that?

MR. WEINREB: Yes, your Honor. This is Bill Weinreb, counsel for Mr. Taylor.

Your Honor, I want to sincerely apologize for submitting those filings without following the Court's procedures. It was just careless of me in not observing the October 19th deadline for filing motions in limine without

advance permission. And the Court's absolutely right, the fact that we received things after the deadline is no excuse for not having called to seek permission to file those, but if I can be permitted a word of explanation, it was simply in the rush of responding to things and doing all the last-minute things that lawyers do in advance of a trial. Frankly, the fact that there had been -- October 19th was a cutoff date slipped my mind, and it was just pure carelessness on my part, and I deeply regret it. I can only apologize.

THE COURT: Well, thank you for that apology. I will not impose, then, any sanctions, but I will warn counsel that recidivism will not be taken lightly.

All right. I think the only remaining thing, then, is the government wanted to talk about the responses they've got to the subpoena or something like that?

MR. HARTMAN: Yes, your Honor.

So the defense has filed a motion to quash a subpoena that we served on their expert. And what prompted our sending that subpoena is that we've been engaged in dialogue with the defense about the disclosures that we have received in this case generally and also with respect to Mr. Flemmons. The parties had agreed on a date for a 26.2 material to be exchanged, and today, we've only received one piece of material for one witness despite the fact that there are numerous witnesses that are listed on the defense witness list.

But, specifically, this is an issue particularly with respect to Mr. Flemmons because while we did receive notice of his testimony, we haven't received an expert report, we haven't received the other types of disclosures that you would typically get with an expert witness. So we wrote to the defense, and we asked for those things. We asked for a copy of the report, if there was one; we asked for any drafts of the report; we asked for information about compensation and communications with the expert about the scope of work and the defense request for what the expert would do. And the response was, you're not entitled to that information, and we're not providing it.

So where we are, Judge, is that we -- I know the Court is very focused on expert testimony and the admissibility of expert testimony, and we don't feel that we have sufficient information about this witness and what he would say to properly raise with the Court and litigate issues about what wouldn't be permissible and also to prepare to rebut this evidence, if necessary or appropriate.

THE COURT: All right.

Before I hear from defense counsel, is the government calling any experts?

MR. HARTMAN: We are not.

THE COURT: Okay.

Is the defense calling any experts other than

Mr. Flemmons?

MR. WEINREB: This is Bill Weinreb again.

No, your Honor, we are not.

THE COURT: I'm very sorry this didn't come up sooner because it is an area that has absorbed a lot of my attention over the years. In civil cases, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure lay out in great detail what has to be produced with respect to an expert long before trial; indeed, of course, you also get a deposition of the expert in civil cases.

In criminal cases, the rule has been much more relaxed. I proposed, two years ago, to the relevant committee of the federal judiciary a rule that would make the disclosures in criminal cases parallel those in civil cases, other than depositions, and although the committee did not go that far, they have promulgated a proposed new rule, which unless Congress vetoes it, will take effect on December 1st. But, of course, that's not binding on you because this trial will be over by December 1st.

By the way, that's pretty much what I'm going to tell the jury. I'm going to say this will be a multiweek trial, we hope to finish it by Thanksgiving, though, we can't guarantee that, but we are more than confident that it will be over by the end of November. So if anyone disagrees with that, say so right now.

But, in any event, on that assumption, the new rule

doesn't govern. But I don't see any reason why there shouldn't be such disclosures from the expert to allow the other side to challenge his opinions. Inherent in the nature of expert testimony is that it involves a lot of, if you will, silent background about the expertise, training, skills, and so forth of the expert. This, in part, was an argument, in effect, being made by the defense in this case in some of the motions in limine when they were arguing that some of the government's witnesses that were purportedly fact witnesses were really concealed expert witnesses. But the point comes down to the same point either way — it is just not fair to put an expert on the stand and expect the other side to be able to meaningfully cross—examine that person without knowing in advance a reasonably detailed account of what that expert is going to say.

So here's how I have handled this problem in the past, and I will throw out the alternatives and see if any of them commend themselves.

One is to give the party -- often it's the government's expert, and the party that doesn't know what's going on is the defense, but, in this case, it's vice versa -- give the party that is not calling the expert a three-hour telephonic deposition with the expert well in advance of when the expert is to be called.

The second possibility is for the party calling the

expert to provide the other side with an expert report and expert disclosures more or less modeled on those of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, I think it's 26.

And, in either case, I almost always hold an evidentiary hearing out of the presence of the jury with the witness shortly before the witness testifies to get a sense of what can or cannot be admitted.

So let me ask defense counsel, on those first two alternatives, which do you prefer?

MR. WEINREB: Your Honor, this is Bill Weinreb.

You put us a bit on the spot because we have two sets of defense counsel here and don't have an opportunity to confer.

THE COURT: That's fair enough. So let me know by email to my law clerk no later than 5:00 o'clock today which of those two alternatives you prefer. Don't tell me you don't want either; that will not be acceptable.

MR. WEINREB: Understood.

THE COURT: All right.

I think, for the moment, that should satisfy the government. If there is a deposition or there is an expert report, it's going to have to be in the next week or so, to give the government plenty of time to prepare.

MR. WEINREB: Thank you, your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else we need to take up?

MR. WEINREB: Yes, your Honor. This is Bill Weinreb.

So, given that this is how that issue is going to be handled, would the Court offer us any guidance on the subpoena, the Rule 17 subpoena, that we can convey to Mr. Flemmons?

THE COURT: So Mr. Flemmons, does he work for a company?

MR. WEINREB: He does.

THE COURT: Do they have a lawyer representing him?

MR. WEINREB: They don't, I believe, have a lawyer who would be in a position to represent him directly. They would have to engage outside counsel to do so.

THE COURT: I mean, they're the ones who have the standing to challenge the subpoena. There are limited challenges that the defense can bring, but the great bulk of challenges can only be brought by the party receiving the subpoena.

MR. WEINREB: Well, your Honor, we understand that the defense's right to challenge it may be limited. In this case, we believe that we have made meritorious challenges, which are in the pleading that we filed. And, in addition, it was our reading of the case law that the recipient of the subpoena can, particularly in this situation where it's an expert for one of the parties, authorize the party to represent them in connection with the subpoena.

THE COURT: I haven't seen any such authorization. If

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you obtain that authorization, I agree, that might solve the problem. All right. So I think the best way to handle this is, on Monday, we're getting together at 9:45. Experience suggests that the jury panel won't be ready until about 10:30, 10:15 at the earliest, so we will have a half hour at least. So I will hear then any argument either side wants to make on anything related to the subpoena if the person appearing on behalf of Mr. Flemmons is authorized to represent him. And I've gotten already from my law clerk some idea of what the issues are, but in a moment of complete weakness, I will authorize both sides, if they want to put in anything further on this issue, they can submit to my law clerk's email, by no later than 5:00 p.m. on Sunday, a letter, not to exceed three single-spaced pages, adding anything else you think might be helpful to the Court when I hear oral argument on this on Monday morning.

All right. Anything else?

MR. HARTMAN: Nothing from the government, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. BRUCE: Nothing from Mr. Petit, your Honor. Thank you.

MR. WEINREB: And nothing more from Mr. Taylor, your Honor. Thank you very much.

THE COURT: Very good. I look forward to seeing you all on Monday, and have a good weekend. Bye. * * *